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Executive Summary
Coverage provisions are the most complex part of any managed care contract.  This
is particularly true for Medicaid agencies, because of important differences between
Medicaid and insurance.  This Issue Brief identifies general issues that should be addressed as
managed care contracts are developed and drafted, and it specifically explores the challenges
faced by public purchasers when drafting managed care coverage provisions.
In t roduc t i on
A central issue in any contract of insurance (including managed care contracts)2 is
the provisions that govern how coverage will be determined.  Coverage determination
entails a series of sub-issues: how coverage will be decided and by whom; the standards that
will be used to determine coverage; the exclusions from coverage that will be permitted
under the contract; the process for reviewing coverage determinations; and the remedies
that will be available for erroneous determinations.
Coverage decision-making has been a central matter in insurance policy for decades.
 However, it has received far greater attention in recent years with the advent of managed
                                                
1 A sample of the types of topics the Issue Brief Series might cover in the future include:
Quality in Managed Care Contracting; Out-of-Plan Care (including a discussion of court- and agency-
ordered treatment); Contract Compliance and Monitoring (including a discussion of issues related to
contract start-up and oversight in a contract’s first year of existence); Network Formation and
Adequacy; Benefits versus Defined Contributions; and Issues in the Development of Carve-Out
Contracts.
2 In this Issue Brief, the term “insurance coverage” is used to denote any type of health plan
(including an employer-based plan) that uses traditional insurance principles to make coverage
determinations.  In their coverage decision-making role, managed care organizations (including HMOs)
have the features of insurance carriers and may be licensed as such in some states.  See, e.g., McEvoy v
Group Health Cooperative of Eau Claire, 570 N.W.2d 397 (Wis. Sup. Ct. 1997).
2care and the growth of prospective coverage determination procedures.3  Prospective
decision-making has been a common insurance practice for more than 20 years, but its
frequency has grown under managed care in order to achieve greater control over health
care budgeting and the allocation of health services themselves.   As a result, Americans
have become far more sensitive to the issue of coverage decision-making, because coverage
increasingly is equated with access.  In recent years, many state lawmakers have sought to
address aspects of coverage decision-making, and numerous bills that would affect all
aspects of coverage decision-making now are pending in Congress.
This Issue Brief examines the elements of coverage decision-making and considers
their implications for Medicaid managed care contracting.  While this Issue Brief focuses on
Medicaid, its discussion is potentially applicable to other forms of publicly purchased
insurance coverage (such as managed care enrollments purchased with Community Mental
Health Services Block Grant funding4).  This is because, like Medicaid, other forms of
public health care financing frequently have covered care and services that fall outside
traditional notions of what is insurable.  If these differences are not taken into account as
contracts are developed, the result can be the unintended loss of certain aspects of coverage,
especially for individuals with serious and chronic illness whose health care needs fall
outside of traditional insurance norms.  In the case of Medicaid, which is governed by a
complex federal statute with its own coverage standards, state agencies remain liable for
coverage of all Medicaid benefits, regardless of whether they contract with private risk
companies to help administer a portion of their state plans.  Other public health care
financing programs are unlike Medicaid in that they are not structured as defined-benefit
entitlement programs.  Nonetheless, depending on their scope of coverage under state law,
these other programs may either retain residual liability for coverage or else experience the
loss of certain coverage as a result of their differences from traditional insurance.
Distinguishing Between Medicaid and Insurance Principles
It is easy to think of Medicaid as public insurance.  Indeed, national statistical
estimates of insurance coverage patterns among Americans treat Medicaid as public
insurance.  To be sure, Medicaid has the essential features of insurance: It is a program that
entitles eligible persons to coverage for a defined set of health care items and services, many
of which are also found in traditional insurance policies.  In both Medicaid and insurance,
moreover, coverage of enumerated items and services is limited to care that is medically
necessary.
At this point, however, the similarities between Medicaid and private insurance
cease in certain key respects.  Medicaid is a public, third-party financing program that
entitles eligible persons to a benefit package defined by federal statutes and regulations. 
This benefit package finances a broader range of health care than typically is available
through insurance, because Medicaid beneficiaries generally are in poorer health than
persons covered by private insurance.5  Actual coverage of enumerated benefits is governed
                                                
3 See Rand Rosenblatt, Sylvia Law, and Sara Rosenbaum, Law and the American Health Care
System (Foundation Press, Old Westbury N.Y., 1997; 1998 Supplement), Ch. 2(E).
4 See 42 U.S.C. §§300x—300x-35.
5 This is true not only in the case of elderly and disabled persons, but also with respect to families
with children.  See, e.g., W. Pete Welch and Martia Wade, “Relative Costs of Medicaid Enrollees and the
3by tests of reasonableness.6  On the other hand, traditional insurance is designed to cover an
essentially healthy work force and operates in accordance with contractual principles of
coverage.  And while virtually all states mandate the inclusion of certain benefits in state-
regulated insurance policies and federal lawmakers in recent years have demonstrated a
growing interest in mandated benefits, the actual determination of coverage for any
enumerated class of benefits is governed by the contracts of coverage between buyers and
sellers, which rest upon the principles of the insurance industry itself.   These principles can
be quite different from those which govern Medicaid, and they must be kept in mind when
developing Medicaid managed care service agreements.
Medicaid/Insurance Dist inct ions
Some of the distinctions between Medicaid and private insurance are relatively well
known.  As noted, Medicaid covers many classes of benefits that are not commonly found
in private insurance, such as long-term hospitalization for physical and mental health
problems and nursing home and home health benefits without regard to prior
hospitalization status.7  Medicaid benefits also must be covered without arbitrary limits on
the amount or duration of coverage; this is especially true for children.8  For example, 
Medicaid-enrolled children with mental illness are entitled to all medically necessary care,
while privately insured children may be covered for only a certain number of outpatient
visits each year.  Another distinction can be found in the definitions used to describe
covered items and services.  For example, Medicaid’s statutory definition of pregnancy-
related care includes not only prenatal, delivery, and post-partum care but, unlike insurance,
also care for conditions that could complicate pregnancy.9
Other distinctions between Medicaid and private insurance are more subtle and are
evident only through careful comparison of Medicaid and private insurance principles. 
These differences become evident during individual coverage determinations (i.e., the
process by which the payor decides if an enrollee is eligible to have benefit payments made
on his or her behalf).  
The “restore to normalcy” test.  One subtle but key distinction between insurance and
Medicaid is how the two systems address the coverage needs of persons with chronic illness.
 The principal goal of insurance is to cover workers and their families; thus, coverage may
                                                                                                                                                
Commercially Insured in HMOs,” Health Affairs 14:2, pp. 212-24 (Summer, 1995); Pamela Loprest and
Gregory Acs, “Profile of Disability Among Families on AFDC,” The Urban Institute (August, 1996).
6  42 C.F.R. §440.230(c).  See, e.g., Curtis v Taylor, 625 F. 2d 645 (5th Cir. 1980); Beal v Doe, 432 U.S.
438 (1979); Alexander v Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).  Special tests of reasonableness apply to Medicaid
coverage of children under 21 because of the preventive nature of the program.  Bond v Stanton, 655 F. 2d 766
(7th Cir. 1981); Mitchell v Johnston, 701 F. 2d 337 (5th Cir. 1983).
7 42 U.S.C. §§1396d(a)(1) and (2).
8  See Curtis v Taylor and Alexander v Choate, supra note 6.  Limits can be placed on the amount,
scope, or duration of coverage as long as the needs of the overwhelming majority of patients are satisfied.  In
the case of children, courts have consistently overturned limitations in coverage that might have been
acceptable in the case of adults because of the preventive purposes of Medicaid’s Early and Periodic Screening,
Diagnosis, and Treatment (EPSDT) benefit package, to which all children under age 21 are entitled.  For a
review of EPSDT litigation, please request from the Center for Health Policy Research a copy of An Overview of
EPSDT Administrative and Coverage Cases, prepared by Sara Rosenbaum, Joel Teitelbaum, and Colleen Sonosky.
9 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(10)(E).
4be limited to care and services that are necessary to permit an acutely sick person to recover
to a prior normal functioning level.  Care and services needed to maintain a chronically ill
person in relatively stable health might be excluded as not necessary for recovery.
The “illness or injury” test.  Another distinction has to do with the scope of health
problems covered by private insurance and Medicaid.  Medicaid covers services needed to
treat not only “illnesses and injuries”, but also undefined conditions--such as developmental
disabilities in children--that do not stem from an acute illness or injury.  Limitations that
exclude treatment for such conditions possibly would be permissible under traditional
insurance,10 but not under Medicaid.11  For example, a toddler who needs speech therapy
to ameliorate the effects of a developmental disability would be eligible for coverage under
Medicaid but not under an insurance plan that limited speech therapy coverage to
individuals recovering from an illness or injury (e.g., a stroke).
Exclusions and evidence.  An additional distinction between Medicaid and insurance
involves the use of exclusions.  As noted, both Medicaid and insurance coverage exclude
coverage of services that are not medically necessary.  But insurers typically employ many
more exclusions and may use broader measures to determine when something is excluded. 
For example, covered services furnished to children who need special education and related
medical care under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act may be excluded by
insurers as “educational”.  However, this exclusion is expressly prohibited under
Medicaid.12  Additionally, a growing number of insurers may elect to exclude services that
do not comport with industry-developed practice guidelines or that have not been proven
effective through controlled, randomized trials.  Such exclusions may be lawful if the
insurance contract does not expressly provide for such coverage or if the decision to exclude
is not an abuse of discretion.13  Medicaid principles, on the other hand, require Medicaid
agencies to use reasonable, non-discriminatory criteria in setting exclusions and limitations. 
For example, where a procedure is accepted among relevant health practitioners and there is
no contradictory body of evidence from scientific studies to indicate its non-effectiveness,
coverage must be permitted.14  Thus, insurance principles give insurers broad discretion to
set the parameters of coverage in the absence of express contractual provisions requiring
coverage.  The discretion of Medicaid agencies, on the other hand, is bound by tests of
reasonableness.
Procedural due process distinctions.  A final distinction has to do with the process for
determining coverage and the procedures that must be followed when coverage is denied,
reduced, or terminated.  Medicaid policy limits the use of prior authorization programs,
                                                
10 The impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act on such distinctions has not yet been tested.  It
is possible that such coverage distinctions based on a member’s condition are no longer lawful.  For a broader
discussion of this issue, see Law and the American Health Care System, supra note 3, Chs. 2(F) and 4.  For an
example of the distinction between illnesses and injuries on the one hand and conditions on the other, see
“Calling Infertility a Disease, Couples Battle With Insurers,” Esther B. Fein, The New York Times, February
22, 1998, Section 1, Page 1.
11 42 C.F.R. §440.230(c) prohibits arbitrary limitations on required services based on a beneficiary’s
diagnosis or condition.  See, e.g., Beal v Doe, supra note 6.
12 42 U.S.C. §1396b(e).
13 See, e.g., Adams v Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Maryland, 757 F. Supp. 661 (D. Md. 1992).
14 See, e.g., Weaver v Reagen, 701 F. Supp. 717  (D. Mo. 1988); Rush v Parham, 440 F. Supp. 383 (D.
Ga. 1977).
5particularly in the area of drug coverage.15  Additionally, prior authorization systems must
function reasonably, taking into account the scope and speed of review, the review
standards, and the evidence that reviewers must consider.16  In the case of  prescribed
drugs, states that use drug formularies must abide by certain prior authorization procedures
and must provide immediate supplies of non-formulary drugs when an emergency medical
need presents itself.  Conversely, private insurers have broad latitude to fashion prior
authorization programs in the absence of express contractual provisions.17
Moreover, because Medicaid is a need-based welfare program, constitutional
principles of due process prohibit individual, fact-based coverage denials, reductions, or
terminations from becoming final until an individual has been afforded an opportunity for
an impartial, fair hearing.18  When the reduction or termination of assistance is involved,
the decision of the agency cannot take effect until a fair hearing has been conducted, if a
timely request for a hearing is made.19  Under Medicaid, the burden of proof falls to the
agency to show why coverage should not be provided.  An insurer’s coverage decisions, on
the other hand, take effect immediately, and the burden is on the claimant to show that the
insurer’s determination violates the terms of the contract or principles of tort law.20
Implications of Medicaid/Insurance Distinctions for Contract Drafting
A state Medicaid agency, in contracting with managed care insurers, may decide to
buy the insurer’s traditional product and continue to provide direct coverage for those items
and services that are excluded by the insurer.  The agency may also decide to retain direct
responsibility for procedural reviews, including prior authorization reviews and the
evidentiary phase of a fair hearing process.  The agency can also decide that it will pay for
items and services that fall outside the scope of the agreement as a result of the insurer’s use
of coverage determination procedures that differ from those applicable to Medicaid.  But
most agencies desire to buy precisely these coverage determination and review services from
their managed care contractors.  Where contracts fail to track the law, the results can be
unexpected liability on the part of the agency for Medicaid services and procedures that fall
outside the contract but within the scope of Medicaid,21 as well as confusion and de facto
loss of coverage and protections for beneficiaries. These oversights can also place burdens
on managed care companies, who may not understand these key distinctions and who face
sanctions by the Medicaid agency for the denial of covered care.
For these reasons, care is needed in developing the coverage components of a
managed care service agreement.  The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 heightens the need for
                                                
15 42 U.S.C. §1396r—8(d)(5).
16 See, e.g., Dodson v Parham, 427 F. Supp. 97 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Wickline v State of California, 741 P. 2d
613 (Cal. 1987).
17 This discretion is subject to certain limitations such as a breach of contract claim or a tort liability
claim, particularly the tort of bad faith breach of contract.  See, e.g., McEvoy v Group Health Cooperative of Eau
Claire, supra note 2.
18 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(4); 42 C.F.R. §431.231(a)(3).
19 42 C.F.R. §431.231(c).
20 See, e.g., cases cited in Law and the American Health Care System, supra note 3, Ch. 2(E).
21 Regardless of whether state agencies administer their Medicaid programs directly or through
insurance contractors, they remain liable for compliance with federal law, and this obligation is non-delegable. 
See, e.g., J.K. v Dillenberg, 836 F. Supp. 694 (D. Az. 1993); Daniels v Wadley, 926 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Tenn. 1996).
6attention to this set of issues: The Act requires state agencies and managed care
organizations to fully disclose to beneficiaries which Medicaid services are available through
the managed care plan and which will continue to be furnished directly by the state agency.
 Specifically, the Act provides that each managed care contract “shall specify the benefits
and the provision (or the arrangement) for which the entity is responsible.”22
As this Issue Brief demonstrates, drawing a managed care contract’s coverage line is
far more complex than merely identifying which classes of benefits are covered in the
contract; for even within a covered class of benefits, some services may be in the agreement
itself while others may fall outside the scope of the contract and remain directly covered.
Key Issues in Contract Development and Drafting
In light of the above discussion, agencies and plans should consider the following
issues when developing contracts and establishing premiums.
1. The Medical Necessity Standard23
Agencies should articulate a medical necessity standard that conforms to their
current standard and that incorporates into the definition provisions related to evidence and
burdens of proof.  Thus, for example, agencies should consider specifying that coverage is to
be measured in accordance with accepted standards of medical and health practice and can
be denied, reduced, or terminated only if the insurer can demonstrate that the proposed
coverage is contrary to the opinions of relevant practitioners who have expertise in the field
or specific and to relevant scientific studies.  This type of clause maintains a “professional”
standard (as opposed to an “evidence-based” or “corporate” standard) for decision-making
and ensures that adverse coverage determinations are based on reasonable evidence and that
the burden of proof remains with the decision-maker.
In the case of coverage for children, coverage must occur at a point at which
treatment can prevent or ameliorate an illness or condition.  Pennsylvania’s 1996 Request For
Proposal contains a comprehensive definition of pediatric medical necessity:
[For a service to be medically necessary, one of the following standards must
be met:]
The service or benefit will, or is reasonably expected to, prevent the onset of
an illness, condition, or disability[;] The service or benefit will, or is
                                                
22 42 U.S.C. §1396v(b)(1).  The statute also provides that “A State directly or through managed care
entities shall, on or before an individual enrolls with such an entity * * * inform the enrollee in a written and
prominent manner of any benefits to which the enrollee may be entitled to [sic] under [Medicaid] but which
are not made available to the enrollee through the entity.  Such information shall include information on where
and how such enrollees may access benefits not made available to the enrollee through the entity.”
23 For other discussions regarding the importance of medical necessity standards in coverage decision-
making, see “Defining ‘Medically Necessary’ Services to Protect Plan Members,”     Managed Mental Health Care
Policy #1   , The Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law (Washington, D.C. 1997), and “Contracting for
Managed Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services: A Guide for Public Purchasers,” Technical Assistance
Publication Series, Health Systems Research, Inc. (Washington, D.C., December, 1997).
7reasonably expected to, reduce or ameliorate the physical, mental, or
developmental effects of an illness, condition, injury, or disability[;] The
service or benefit will assist the individual to achieve or maintain maximum
functional capacity in performing daily activities, taking into account both
the functional capacity of the individual and those functional capacities that
are appropriate for individuals of the same age.  Pennsylvania RFP
(Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System: A Nationwide Study of
Medicaid Managed Care Contracts (1st Ed.), Vol. II(1), p. 2-584) (The George
Washington University Medical Center, Washington, D.C. 1997)
At least one state has expressly elected to depart from the coverage, evidentiary, and
burden-of-proof standards that traditionally have governed Medicaid.  Nebraska’s Medicaid
managed care contracts specifically incorporate a coverage provision that is consistent with
emerging insurance principles of “evidence-based” medical necessity, principles that permit
insurers to limit the evidence they will consider to industry-developed practice standards
and the results of randomized clinical trials (which for many reasons are still extremely
rare).24  Moreover, the Nebraska definition places the burden of proof on the claimant,
rather than on the company.  The state’s contract provides that:
The term “medical necessity” and “medically necessary” with reference to a
covered service means health care services and supplies which are medically
appropriate and  * * * (3) consistent in type, frequency and duration of treatment
with scientifically based guidelines or national medical, research or health coverage
organizations or governmental agencies;  * * *  (7) of demonstrated value; * * * . The
fact that the physician has performed or prescribed a procedure or treatment
or the fact that it may be the only treatment for a particular injury, sickness
or mental illness does not mean that it is medically necessary.  Nebraska
Mental Health Contract (Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System:
A Nationwide Study of Medicaid Managed Care Contracts (1st Ed.), Vol. II(1), p.
2-282) (The George Washington University Medical Center, Washington,
D.C., 1997) [Emphasis added.]
The legality of this evidentiary standard has not yet been tested in Medicaid law.  To
the extent that an agency follows the standard, it may want to retain the authority, as
discussed above, to override specific coverage decisions under the test.
2. Permissible Exclusions and Definitions
Contracts should address in detail the applicability of certain common insurance
exclusions, including the exclusion of experimental services as well as the exclusion of
services solely because of the manner or setting in which they are furnished or the basis of
the coverage request.  Common insurer exclusionary practices can be found in the areas of
“educational” services, “social” services (e.g., services recommended by child welfare
agencies), court-ordered treatment, or treatment identified as necessary by, for example, an
                                                
24 For an excellent article setting forth the elements of evidence-based necessity, see David M. Eddy,
Rationing Resources While Improving Quality: How to Get More for Less, 272 JAMA 817 (1994).
8education agency or other agency caring for a managed care enrollee.  Many of these services
now are covered by states as a matter of either mandatory or discretionary policy.
Definitions also are important.  As the “pregnancy-related care” example above
indicates, in a number of instances Medicaid uses relatively broad federal or state plan
definitions to delineate the scope of a covered service.  Agencies should consult applicable
statutes and regulations to ensure that their contract definitions are consistent with federal
and state law.  In the case of state plan definitions, agencies should determine if they will
hold their contractors to the state plan scope of coverage or allow companies to alter or
narrow the terms of coverage, thereby creating residual agency liability as a matter of state
law.
3. Prior Authorization Systems and Procedural Due Process
Some, but not all, state managed care service agreements currently in force delineate
basic rules for prior authorization programs, including prior authorization statutory
mandates.  At a minimum, the federal drug coverage provisions should be incorporated by
reference and states should consider developing general standards that specify reasonable
time frames for coverage determinations, with automatic approval in the event that an
insurer’s timelines do not prove to be reasonable.  Key general issues are: (1) the
appropriateness of prior authorization at all (e.g., prohibiting its use in emergency
situations); (2) time lines for determinations (e.g., within one day of the request in the case
of urgent care, or within eight hours of a request for an off-formulary drug); (3) the
qualifications of reviewing personnel (e.g., determinations of medical necessity of extended
addiction treatment services may be made only by a professional with expertise in addiction
treatment); and (4) the form and time lines for communicating the decision (e.g., a written
decision within one day of the determination, communicated to the provider and the
beneficiary).
With respect to the review of coverage determinations, most Medicaid contracts
require grievance and appeal systems for beneficiaries who are denied coverage; the
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 mandates the use of such systems in states that elect to
purchase Medicaid managed care as a state option.  However, many contracts do not set
forth procedural specifications for grievances, even though the managed care grievance
process, if properly constructed, could theoretically function as the initial evidentiary
determination phase of the federal fair hearing process, thereby bringing the two systems
into closer accord.  To address this issue, states should specify in their contracts that: (1)
contractor actions that constitute an adverse determination under the fair hearing system
also are grievable; (2) plan notices must comport with federal content and form
requirements; (3) where a grievance is requested in a timely fashion, coverage must continue
pending the final fair hearing decision; (4) the grievance itself should comply with all
regulatory requirements regarding local evidentiary hearings; and (5) individuals can appeal
an adverse grievance decision to the state.
                                                
25 See Sara Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System: A Nationwide Study of Medicaid
Managed Care Contracts (2d Ed.) (The George Washington University Medical Center, Washington, D.C., 1998).
26 42 U.S.C. §1396v(b)(4).
94. Reserving State Authority to Clarify Contract Coverage
Even when care is taken to conform Medicaid and general managed care contract
coverage policies, there may be lapses or gaps where none was anticipated.  An agency may
want to consider following the lead of several states which incorporate into contracts
provisions authorizing the state to rule on initial coverage determinations.  This authority
may be particularly important for services commonly used by persons with chronic illness or
for services furnished in alternative settings (such as special education-related medical care)
where traditional notions of insurance may result in higher than expected exclusions.  Such
authority may also be important for services ordered by courts or other public agencies,
where the state Medicaid agency may want to evaluate the basis of the insurer’s denial.
Measuring Performance as it Relates to Medical Necessity Issues
An essential part of any contract is an explanation of how performance on a
particular specification will be measured and the information that the purchaser requires of
the health plan.  Performance measurement standards are particularly important in public
contracts, because due process considerations require clarity in compliance measurement. 
Performance measurement--including both internal quality performance assessment and
external review--regarding  medical necessity determinations requires a combination of
structure, process, and outcomes measures, examples of which follow:
  Structure measures: all written materials furnished to network providers regarding
coverage, applicable limitations and exclusions, an explanation of how medical necessity
determinations will be made, and identification of services and procedures that require prior
authorization;
  Process measures: explanation of how medical necessity determinations are carried out
(e.g., timelines for determinations, qualifications of personnel making determinations, and
descriptions of evidence considered and the protocols used), description of the prior
authorization program, copies of all practice guidelines used, forms for submission of
evidence, and sample forms used to explain coverage decisions;
  Outcomes measures: the results of reviews of individual medical necessity determinations
for selected services chosen by the purchaser, with ratios of approvals and denials to
requests for prior authorization.
                                                
27 The right to a fair hearing regarding coverage of contract services means that, in effect, all insurer
coverage determinations are subject to state review.  Authorizing state intervention at an earlier point in the
determination process may be more efficient.
28 An example of such an authorizing provision is, “The agency reserves the right (i) to review
Contractor’s coverage determinations with respect to the services and items enumerated under this contract;
and (ii) to require the Contractor to provide coverage in those instances in which the state deems coverage to
be medically necessary.”
10
Conc lu s i on
Addressing coverage issues in Medicaid is a challenge; however, the underlying
structure of Medicaid demands rigorous attention by state agencies because of the potential
loss of benefits among enrollees and unanticipated financial exposure among states.  In
managed care contracting, clear policy decisions and careful drafting are essential because of
the coverage and financial implications of error.  Therefore, the added time spent on
coverage matters represents a pivotal investment for state agencies, particularly as they
move an increasingly disabled population into managed care.  Moreover, even where a
contract is well-drafted, follow-up monitoring is vital.  Monitoring schemes should consider
a contractor’s medical necessity review structure (e.g., instructions to providers and the
professional experience of the contractor’s reviewers); review process (e.g., logs showing
the date on which a request was made and the date on which a decision was communicated
in writing, or time line data for resolution of expedited appeals); and review outcomes,
particularly for services and procedures required by persons with chronic illnesses or
furnished in special settings.
